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JUSTICE KENNEDY’S USE OF SOURCES OF THE ORIGINAL MEANING 
OF THE CONSTITUTION 
 
By Gregory E. Maggs1 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
 Justice Kennedy became an Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court on February 18, 
1988.2  During the nearly one quarter of a century in which he now has held this august office, 
the Supreme Court has decided numerous significant cases, has established important legal tests 
and doctrines in many fields, and has employed various principles for interpreting statutes and 
the Constitution.  This symposium serves a valuable purpose in investigating the many ways in 
which Justice Kennedy has contributed to the Court’s work. 
 
 My essay concerns one aspect of Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence, namely, his use of 
some of the principal sources of the original meaning of the Constitution in his written opinions.   
By the term “sources of the original meaning of the Constitution,” I refer to the records from the 
Federal Constitutional Convention of 1787, the records of the state ratifying conventions, the 
Federalist Papers, dictionaries showing usage of language during the Founding period, and the 
acts of the First Congress.  The goals of this essay are first to identify, quote, and describe 
passages in which Justice Kennedy has cited these sources, and second to draw conclusions 
about what these passages show.  Although I clerked for Justice Kennedy in the October 1989 
term, and have spoken with him regularly since then, he and I have not discussed this particular 
subject.  My assessment is based solely on his written opinions. 
 
 My observations lead me to three conclusions:  First, Justice Kennedy believes that 
sources of the original meaning of the Constitution are important, but he does not rely on them 
frequently.  I found only 22 opinions written by Justice Kennedy that cite on the Federalist 
Papers, the records of the Constitutional Convention, the records of the state ratifying 
conventions, or the Acts of the First Congress.  Second, when Justice Kennedy cites sources of 
the original meaning of the Constitution, he usually uses the sources to confirm background 
principles rather than to resolve the specific issues before the Court.  Third, Justice Kennedy is 
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not opposed to using sources of the original meaning of the Constitution to resolve specific 
issues, but he has done it in very few cases. 
 
II.  Why the Subject Might be Important 
 
 Why might it be important to investigate Justice Kennedy’s reliance on sources of the 
original meaning of the Constitution?  I see three potential reasons.  First, writers have disagreed 
about whether to describe Justice Kennedy as an “originalist” in constitutional interpretation.  An 
originalist judge, as I understand the term, is one who decides constitutional issues based on the 
original meaning of the Constitution.  Prominent scholars have expressed different views on how 
to characterize Justice Kennedy.  For example, Dean Erwin Chemerinsky labels Justice Kennedy 
an originalist,3 while others such as Professors Jamal Greene and Steven Calabresi say that he is 
not an originalist.4  This essay assessing his record of citing sources of the original meaning may 
contribute to resolving this disagreement.  
 
 Second, Justice Kennedy is widely described as the “swing vote” on the Supreme Court.5  
On this view, the Court has two blocks of four justices who commonly vote together in 
constitutional cases.  One block includes Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, 
and Justice Alito, and the other block includes Justice Breyer, Justice Ginsburg, Justice 
Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan.  As the swing vote, Justice Kennedy belongs to neither block, but 
“swings” between them, ultimately deciding which group will be in the majority in many cases.  
If this characterization is accurate, then knowing the kinds of arguments that might persuade 
Justice Kennedy should be very important to litigants because persuading Justice Kennedy may 
be the key to winning many cases.  Among other things that may be important to winning Justice 
Kennedy’s vote in constitutional cases may be understanding the manner in which Justice 
Kennedy does or does not rely on sources of the original meaning of the Constitution. 
 
 Third, over the past twenty-five years, the Supreme Court has cited sources of the 
original meaning of the Constitution more frequently than in any comparable period.6  Numerous 
important decisions, like U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton,7 have involved disputes between the 
majority and dissent about the original meaning of constitutional provisions.   In assessing 
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Justice Kennedy’s record over the past 25 years, a significant question is therefore the extent to 
which Justice Kennedy has contributed to the Supreme Court’s originalist jurisprudence.  This 
essay also may help with this issue. 
 
 Now for a disclaimer: Beyond describing my observations with respect to how Justice 
Kennedy uses sources of the original meaning the Constitution, and arguing about why these 
observations may be important, I do not offer a normative assessment of Justice Kennedy’s 
decision-making. While the issue of whether or to what extent judges must follow the original 
meaning of the Constitution is an important and controversial issue, this issue is beyond the 
scope of this essay. Many other works, of course, address this question in great detail.8 And the 
normative question is separate from, and in my view, should not affect inquiries into whether 
Justice Kennedy is or is not an originalist, about what kinds of arguments influence Justice 
Kennedy, or the extent to which Justice Kennedy has contributed to the Supreme Court’s 
originalist jurisprudence. 
 
III.  Description of the Cases 
 
 What follows is a description of the Supreme Court cases in which Justice Kennedy has 
written opinions—including majority opinions, concurring opinions, and dissents—that cite 
sources of the original meaning of the Constitution.  It does not include descriptions of opinions 
written by other members of the Court even if Justice Kennedy joined those opinions.  In 
conducting research for this essay, I looked for instances in which Justice Kennedy referred to 
the Federalist Papers, the records of the Federal Constitutional Convention, the records of the 
state ratifying conventions, the acts of the First Congress, and dictionaries from the founding 
period.  These sources are commonly cited in support of claims about the original meaning of the 
Constitution.   I limited my inquiry to these five sources solely to make the research more 
manageable.   To be sure, other sources also exist, including very importantly sources that 
address the original meaning of constitutional amendments.  Yet, these are the most commonly 
cited sources, and I have assumed that looking for citations of these sources will provide a 
sufficient sample for making generalizations about Justice Kennedy’s use of all sources of the 
original meaning. 
 
A.  The Federalist Papers 
 
 In 1787 and 1788, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay wrote a total of 85 
essays urging the state of New York to ratify the Constitution.9   Courts have cited these essays 
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9
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as evidence of the original meaning of the Constitution in more than 1700 cases.10   Although 
claims made about the original meaning based on the Federalist Papers are subject to challenge 
on various grounds, the Federalist Papers are a popular source because they are easily accessible 
and because they systematically address nearly every aspect of the Constitution. 
 
 Justice Kennedy has cited the Federalist Papers in 21 of his opinions.11  In two of these 
cases, Missouri v. Jenkins12 and Public Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice,13 Justice Kennedy 
relied greatly on the Federalist Papers in reaching his conclusion on the specific issues before the 
Court.  In Missouri v. Jenkins, the Supreme Court invalidated a federal district court order that 
had increased property taxes within a school district to pay for the desegregation of the district’s 
schools. Justice Kennedy wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in 
which he concluded that federal courts cannot issue remedial orders imposing taxes.  He based 
this conclusion both on the text of Article III of the Constitution and on what the Federalist 
Papers said about judicial power.  Justice Kennedy wrote:  
 
The description of the judicial power nowhere includes the word “tax” or 
anything that resembles it. This reflects the Framers’ understanding that taxation 
was not a proper area for judicial involvement. “The judiciary . . . has no 
influence over either the sword or the purse, no direction either of the strength or 
of the wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution whatever.”  The 
Federalist No. 78, p. 523 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).14 
 
 In Public Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice,15 the Supreme Court held that as a matter 
of statutory interpretation the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA)16 did not apply to the 
American Bar Association (ABA) when the ABA provided advice to the Justice Department on 
federal judicial nominees.17  Justice Kennedy wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment.18  He 
concluded that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the FACA would apply to the ABA, but he 
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 See id. at 802. 
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 I did not count two cases, Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005), and Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe 
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concluded that such application would violate the Appointments Clause in Article II.19 Justice 
Kennedy began by asserting that “[t]he Framers of our Government knew that the most precious 
of liberties could remain secure only if they created a structure of Government based on a 
permanent separation of powers. See, e.g., The Federalist Nos. 47-51 (J. Madison).”20  He then 
cited the Federalist Papers again to explain his concern about using the “absurd result” canon of 
statutory construction to resolve the case: “I believe the Court’s loose invocation of the ‘absurd 
result’ canon of statutory construction creates too great a risk that the Court is exercising its own 
‘WILL instead of JUDGMENT,’ with the consequence of ‘substituti[ng] [its own] pleasure to 
that of the legislative body.’ The Federalist No. 78, p. 469 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. 
Hamilton).”21  Turning to the constitutional issue, Justice Kennedy relied heavily on what the 
Federalist Papers said about presidential appointments.  Justice Kennedy wrote: “No role 
whatsoever is given either to the Senate or to Congress as a whole in the process of choosing the 
person who will be nominated for appointment.”22  He then quoted three specific statements by 
Hamilton in the Federalist Papers which also supported the view that the President alone would 
choose nominees.23  These quotations weighed heavily in Justice Kennedy’s decision that 
applying the FACA to the ABA when the ABA provides advice on nominees would violate the 
Appointments Clause. 
 
 In the other 19 cases in which Justice Kennedy cited the Federalist Papers, he did not rely 
directly on them in deciding the issue before the court. Instead, Justice Kennedy cited the 
Federalist Papers to confirm generally accepted background principles about the nature of the 
United States government and about the concerns of the Framers.  Explication of these 
background issues help to introduct the questions about which Justice Kennedy was writing but 
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 Id. at 482. The Appointments Clause says that the President “by and with the Advice and Consent of 
the Senate, shall appoint  . . . Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, 
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law . . .” 
U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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 Id. at 468. 
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 Id. at 471. 
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 Id. at 483. 
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 The first quotation said:  “ ‘In the act of nomination, [the President’s] judgment alone would be 
exercised; and as it would be his sole duty to point out the man who, with the approbation of the Senate, 
should fill an office, his responsibility would be as complete as if he were to make the final 
appointment.’ ”  Id. at 483 (quoting The Federalist No. 76, 456-457 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (emphasis 
added)).”  The second quotation said:  “ ‘It will be the office of the President to nominate, and, with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint. There will, of course, be no exertion of choice on the part of 
the Senate. They may defeat one choice of the Executive, and oblige him to make another; but they 
cannot themselves choose-they can only ratify or reject the choice he may have  made.’ “ Id. (quoting The 
Federalist No. 66, at 405 (emphasis in original).  The third quotation said: “ ‘“The sole and undivided 
responsibility of one man will naturally beget a livelier sense of duty and a more exact regard to 
reputation. He will, on this account, feel himself under stronger obligations, and more interested to 
investigate with care the qualities requisite to the stations to be filled, and to prefer with impartiality the 
persons who may have the fairest pretensions to them.’ “ Id. at 483 n.4 (quoting The Federalist No. 76, at 
455-456.).  
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did nit decide the questions.  With the hope that I do not overwhelm anyone reading this essay 
with detail, I include here a brief description of each of these additional 19 cases and quote what 
Justice Kennedy said about the Federalist Papers.  I feel this is the best way to convey the 
difference between these cases and Missouri v. Jenkins and Public Citizen v. U.S. Department of 
Justice. 
 
 (1)  In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,24 the Supreme Court considered 
the constitutionality of a federal campaign finance law that, among other things, attempted to 
limit corporate financing of elections.25  In his opinion for the Court, Justice Kennedy wrote 
about the problem of political power and whether limiting the speech of corporations was a 
proper remedy.26   He said: 
 
Factions will necessarily form in our Republic, but the remedy of “destroying the 
liberty” of some factions is “worse than the disease.” The Federalist No. 10, p. 
130 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (J. Madison).  Factions should be checked by permitting 
them all to speak, see ibid., and by entrusting the people to judge what is true and 
what is false.27 
 
In this passage, Justice Kennedy is not interpreting the First Amendment, but setting the context 
for his opinion in the case by explaining James Madison’s understanding of the power of 
political parties and Madison’s support for free speech. 
 
 (2)  In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.,28 the Supreme Court held that a state 
supreme court justice should have recused himself under the circumstances of a particular case.29  
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Kennedy started by discussing the leading precedent of 
Tumey v. Ohio.30  Justice Kennedy wrote:  “The Tumey Court concluded that the Due Process 
Clause incorporated the common-law rule that a judge must recuse himself when he has ‘a direct, 
personal, substantial, pecuniary interest’ in a case.”31  Immediately after this sentence, Justice 
Kennedy explained:  “This rule reflects the maxim that ‘[n]o man is allowed to be a judge in his 
own cause; because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt 
his integrity.’ The Federalist No. 10, p. 59 (J. Cooke ed.1961) (J. Madison).”32  Again in this 
instance, Justice Kennedy is not using the Federalist Papers to decide the issue in the case, but 
instead to frame the issue with an accepted basic principle. 
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 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
25
 See id. at 886. 
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 Id. at 970 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). 
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 Id. at 2257. 
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 273 U.S. 510 (1927). 
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 129 S. Ct. at 2259. 
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 Id. 
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 (3) In Boumediene v. Bush,33 the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a 
provision of the Military Commissions Act of 200634 that sought to prevent federal courts from 
exercising jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions filed by suspected enemy belligerents 
confined at the U.S. Navy Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.35  In his opinion for the Court, 
Justice Kennedy provided considerable background about the writ of habeas corpus.36  In one 
passage, Justice Kennedy noted that “Alexander Hamilton [like others] explained that by 
providing the detainee a judicial forum to challenge detention, the writ [of habeas corpus] 
preserves limited government.”37  Justice Kennedy then quoted at length a statement from 
Federalist No. 84, written by Alexander Hamilton that supported this proposition.38  The citation 
served to support a general proposition about the purpose of writs of habeas corpus, rather than 
to decide the particular issue before the Court, namely, whether federal courts could assert 
habeas corpus jurisdiction over detainees in Cuba. 
 
 (4) In Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis,39 the Supreme Court upheld a 
Kentucky income tax law that exempted interest on bonds issued by the Kentucky government 
and its subdivisions but did not exempt interest on bonds issued by other states.  The Court ruled 
that the difference in treatment did not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.40  Justice 
Kennedy wrote a dissenting opinion in which he made the following statement: 
 
The object of creating free trade throughout a single nation, without protectionist 
state laws, was a dominant theme of the convention at Philadelphia and during the 
ratification debates that followed. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 22, pp. 143–144 
(C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton) (“It is indeed evident, on the most 
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 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
34
 10 U.S.C. § 948a et seq. (Supp. 2007) 
35
 Id. at 732. 
36
 See id. at 739-752. 
37
 Id. at 744-745. 
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 The passage that Justice Kennedy cited said:  “[T]he practice of arbitrary imprisonments, have been, in 
all ages, the favorite and most formidable instruments of tyranny. The observations of the judicious 
Blackstone ... are well worthy of recital: ‘To bereave a man of life ... or by violence to confiscate his 
estate, without accusation or trial, would be so gross and notorious an act of despotism as must at once 
convey the alarm of tyranny throughout the whole nation; but confinement of the person, by secretly 
hurrying him to jail, where his sufferings are unknown or forgotten, is a less public, a less striking, and 
therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary government.’ And as a remedy for this fatal evil he is 
everywhere peculiarly emphatical in his encomiums on the habeas corpus act, which in one place he calls 
‘the BULWARK of the British Constitution.’ “ C. Rossiter ed., p. 512 (1961) (quoting 1 Blackstone *136, 
4 id., at *438).”  553 U.S. at 744-745. 
39
 553 U.S. 328 (2008). 
40
 Id. at 331. 
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superficial view, that there is no object, either as it respects the interest of trade or 
finance, that more strongly demands a federal superintendence”).41 
 
As in the previous examples, the quotation from the Federalist Papers is important in establishing 
context, and it confirms a general proposition which is largely uncontroversial: the Framers 
supported free-trade among the states.  The quotation was not intended to resolve the specific 
issue under consideration. 
 
 (5) In Roper v. Simmons,42 the Supreme Court held that imposing capital punishment on 
individuals who were under 18 years of age at the time of their capital crimes is prohibited by the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.43  Justice Kennedy, who wrote the majority opinion, made 
the following general statement about how Americans view the Constitution:  “Over time, from 
one generation to the next, the Constitution has come to earn the high respect and even, as 
Madison dared to hope, the veneration of the American people. See The Federalist No. 49, p. 314 
(C. Rossiter ed. 1961).”44  This statement merely established background, and was not used to 
resolve the specific issue before the Court.  
 
 (6)  In United States v. Locke,45 the Court held that a federal statute governing ports and 
waterways preempted a Washington State law that attempted to regulate oil tankers.  Justice 
Kennedy also wrote the majority opinion in this case.46  In discussing the state legislation, Justice 
Kennedy made the following general remarks:  “The State of Washington has enacted legislation 
in an area where the federal interest has been manifest since the beginning of our Republic and is 
now well established. The authority of Congress to regulate interstate navigation, without 
embarrassment from intervention of the separate States and resulting difficulties with foreign 
nations, was cited in the Federalist Papers as one of the reasons for adopting the Constitution. 
E.g., The Federalist Nos. 44, 12, 64.”47  This general principle did not resolve the issue before 
the Court. 
 
 (7) In Alden v. Maine,48 state probation officers sued the State of Maine in state court to 
recover overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act.49 The Court held that Congress could 
not subject Maine to liability for damages in a state court without the consent of the state.50  
Justice Kennedy, who wrote the majority opinion, cited the Federalist Papers three times in a 
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 Id. at 364 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
42
 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
43
 See id. at 575. 
44
 Id. at 578. 
45
 529 U.S. 89 (2000). 
46
 See id. at 94. 
47
 Id. at 99. 
48
 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
49
 52 Stat. 1060, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. III). 
50
 See 527 U.S. at 771. 
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passage outlining the nature and importance of state sovereignty under the Constitution.  First, 
Justice Kennedy reminded readers that “The States ‘form distinct and independent portions of 
the supremacy, no more subject, within their respective spheres, to the general authority than the 
general authority is subject to them, within its own sphere.’ The Federalist No. 39, p. 245 (C. 
Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison).”51  Second, Justice Kennedy observed that in creating a federal 
government that could regulate individuals directly (and not through the states) “the Founders 
achieved a deliberate departure from the Articles of Confederation: Experience under the 
Articles had ‘exploded on all hands’ the ‘practicality of making laws, with coercive sanctions, 
for the States as political bodies.’ 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 9 (M. Farrand 
ed. 1911) (J. Madison); accord, The Federalist No. 20, at 138 (J. Madison and A. Hamilton).”52  
Third, Justice Kennedy concluded: “The States thus retain ‘a residuary and inviolable 
sovereignty.’ The Federalist No. 39, at 245. They are not relegated to the role of mere provinces 
or political corporations, but retain the dignity, though not the full authority, of sovereignty.”53  
These general propositions framed the issue before the court but were not sufficient to decide the 
issue before the Court.  (As discussed below, however, Justice Kennedy made much more 
specific use of the statements made by James Madison and John Marshall at the Virginia 
ratifying convention in deciding the issue before the court.54) 
 
 (8) In City of Boerne v. Flores,55 the Supreme Court held that the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 199356 exceeded Congress’s power under section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.57  The Religious Freedom Restoration Act sought to prohibit state governments 
from “substantially burden[ing]” an exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of 
general applicability unless the government can demonstrate the burden “(1) is in furtherance of 
a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that . . . 
interest.”58  Justice Kennedy began his constitutional analysis with the following statement:  
“Under our Constitution, the Federal Government is one of enumerated powers. M’Culloch v. 
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 405, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819); see also The Federalist No. 45, p. 292 (C. 
Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison).”59  Again, this is an important background principle, but it was 
not cited for the purpose of directly resolving the issue before the Court. 
  
                                                 
51
 Id. at 714. 
52
 Id. 
53
 Id. at 715. 
54
 See infra part III.A. 
55
 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
56
 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. 
57
 Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment empowers Congress to enforce the guarantees of section 1 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, which includes that guarantee of Due Process.  See U.S. Const. amend. 14, 
§§ 1, 14. 
58
 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1. 
59
 Id. at 516. 
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 (9)  In Loving v. United States,60 the Supreme Court upheld the system for adjudging 
death sentences in the military courts.  At issue was whether it was proper for the President 
rather than Congress to promulgate the list of aggravating factors for courts-martial to consider 
when sentencing service members convicted of capital offenses.61  In the majority opinion, 
Justice Kennedy wrote:  “Though faithful to the precept that freedom is imperiled if the whole of 
legislative, executive, and judicial power is in the same hands, The Federalist No. 47, pp. 325–
326 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961), the Framers understood that a ‘hermetic sealing off of the 
three branches of Government from one another would preclude the establishment of a Nation 
capable of governing itself effectively,’ Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 12 (1976) (per curiam).”62  
As in the previously discussed cases, the basic principle cited (i.e., here, that the separation of 
powers prevents tyranny) was not in dispute.  The citation provided only background. 
 
 (10) In C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown,63 the Supreme Court held that a 
town’s ordinance discriminating against non-local waste processors violated the Dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine.64  Justice Kennedy explained the Dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine by articulating this well-accepted principle: “The central rationale for the rule against 
discrimination is to prohibit state or municipal laws whose object is local economic 
protectionism, laws that would excite those jealousies and retaliatory measures the Constitution 
was designed to prevent.  See The Federalist No. 22, pp. 143-145 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. 
Hamilton).”65  
 
 (11) In Clinton v. City of New York,66 the Supreme Court invalidated a federal act that 
would have given the President a “line-item veto,” allowing the President to veto spending 
provisions and tax breaks in subsequently passed legislation.67  Justice Kennedy wrote a 
concurring opinion in which he cited the Federalist Papers in two near-by passages.  Justice 
Kennedy first said: 
 
 Separation of powers was designed to implement a fundamental insight: 
Concentration of power in the hands of a single branch is a threat to liberty.  The 
Federalist states the axiom in these explicit terms: “The accumulation of all 
                                                 
60
 517 U.S. 748 (1996). 
61
 See id. at 759. 
62
 Id. at 753.  The Court also cited Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380–381 (1989), and noted 
parenthetically that it had quoted The Federalist No. 47). 
63
 511 U.S. 383 (1994). 
64
 See id. at 386.  The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine precludes states from discriminating against 
interstate commerce, from enacting laws on subjects where a uniform national standard is necessary, or 
from imposing an excessive burden on interstate commerce, even if Congress has not legislated in the 
area.  See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 87-90 (1987) (considering each 
of these bases for invalidating a state law). 
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 Id. at 390. 
66
 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
67
 See id. at 436. 
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powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands . . . may justly be 
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”  The Federalist No. 47, p. 301 (C. 
Rossiter ed. 1961).  So convinced were the Framers that liberty of the person 
inheres in structure that at first they did not consider a Bill of Rights necessary. 
The Federalist No. 84, pp. 513, 515 . . . .68 
 
Justice Kennedy then added: 
 
 . . .  In this vision, liberty demands limits on the ability of any one branch 
to influence basic political decisions.  Quoting Montesquieu, the Federalist Papers 
made the point in the following manner: 
 
“ ‘When the legislative and executive powers are united in the 
same person or body,’ says he, ‘there can be no liberty, because 
apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or senate should 
enact tyrannical laws to execute them in a tyrannical manner.’ 
Again: ‘Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the 
life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary 
control, for the judge would then be the legislator.  Were it joined 
to the executive power, the judge might behave with all the 
violence of an oppressor.’ ” The Federalist No. 47, supra, at 303.69 
 
The aim of this extended passage was to frame the issue before the Court, and not to decide the 
issue.  
 
  (12) In Crawford-El v. Britton,70 the Supreme Court held that a state prison inmate need 
not present clear and convincing evidence of improper motive to withstand a summary judgment 
motion in an action against state prison officials under 40 U.S.C. § 1983.71  Justice Kennedy 
wrote a concurring opinion, in which he said: “We must guard against disdain for the judicial 
system. As Madison reminds us, if the Constitution is to endure, it must from age to age retain 
‘th[e] veneration which time bestows.’ James Madison, The Federalist No. 49, p. 314 (C. 
Rossiter ed.1961).”72 Justice Kennedy made this important point only to establish background for 
deciding the issue in the case. 
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 Id.  at 450. 
69
 Id. at 450-51 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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 523 U.S. 574 (1998). 
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 See id. at 594.   The statute in question, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, creates a federal civil cause of action against 
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ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
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the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be 
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” 
72
 Id. at 601 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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 (13)  In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,73 the Supreme Court struck down a state law 
that effectively would have imposed term limits on members of the House of Representatives 
and Senate by restricting access to the ballot after successive terms of office.74  Justice Kennedy 
wrote a concurring opinion in which he said:  “A distinctive character of the National 
Government, the mark of its legitimacy, is that it owes its existence to the act of the whole 
people who created it.  It must be remembered that the National Government, too, is republican 
in essence and in theory. John Jay insisted on this point early in The Federalist Papers, in his 
comments on the government that preceded the one formed by the Constitution.”75  Justice 
Kennedy then quoted at length from The Federalist No. 2.76  Immediately afterwards, Justice 
Kennedy wrote:  “Once the National Government was formed under our Constitution, the same 
republican principles continued to guide its operation and practice. As James Madison explained, 
the House of Representatives ‘derive[s] its powers from the people of America,’ and ‘the 
operation of the government on the people in their individual capacities” makes it “a national 
government,’ not merely a federal one.  Id., No. 39, at 244, 245 (emphasis deleted).”77  Further 
into the opinion, Justice Kennedy added: “Of course, because the Framers recognized that state 
power and identity were essential parts of the federal balance, see The Federalist No. 39, the 
Constitution is solicitous of the prerogatives of the States, even in an otherwise sovereign federal 
province.”78  These references to the Federalist Papers confirmed important background 
principles for understanding what was at stake in the case, but they did not resolve the issue of 
whether the qualifications for office stated in the Constitution were the minimum qualifications 
or both the minimum and maximum qualifications. 
 
 (14) In United States v. Lopez,79 the Supreme Court held that Congress lacked power 
under the Commerce Clause80 to enact the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990,81 which made it 
a federal crime for any person knowingly to possess firearm at place that the person knows or 
has reasonable cause to believe is a school zone.82  The case was significant because it was the 
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 514 U.S. 779 (1995). 
74
 See id. at 783. 
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 Id. at 839 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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 Id.  The quotation was: “To all general purposes we have uniformly been one people; each individual 
citizen everywhere enjoying the same national rights, privileges, and protection. . . .  A strong sense of the 
value and blessings of union induced the people, at a very early period, to institute a federal government 
to preserve and perpetuate it. They formed it almost as soon as they had a political existence. . . .” Id. 
(quoting The Federalist No. 2, pp. 38-39 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)).” 
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 Id. 
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 Id. at 841. 
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 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
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 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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  18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 ed., Supp. V). 
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 See 514 U.S. at 551. 
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first decision in 60 years holding that Congress lacked power to pass a law.83  In a concurring 
opinion, Justice Kennedy cited the Federalist Papers in addressing basic principles of federalism: 
 
 The theory that two governments accord more liberty than one requires for 
its realization two distinct and discernable lines of political accountability: one 
between the citizens and the Federal Government; the second between the citizens 
and the States. If, as Madison expected, the Federal and State Governments are to 
control each other, see The Federalist No. 51, and hold each other in check by 
competing for the affections of the people, see The Federalist No. 46, those 
citizens must have some means of knowing which of the two governments to hold 
accountable for the failure to perform a given function. . . . 
 
 To be sure, one conclusion that could be drawn from The Federalist 
Papers is that the balance between national and state power is entrusted in its 
entirety to the political process.  Madison’s observation that “the people ought not 
surely to be precluded from giving most of their confidence where they may 
discover it to be most due,” The Federalist No. 46, p. 295 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961), 
can be interpreted to say that the essence of responsibility for a shift in power 
from the State to the Federal Government rests upon a political judgment, though 
he added assurance that “the State governments could have little to apprehend, 
because it is only within a certain sphere that the federal power can, in the nature 
of things, be advantageously administered,” ibid. Whatever the judicial role, it is 
axiomatic that Congress does have substantial discretion and control over the 
federal balance. 84 
 
Again in this instance, Justice Kennedy relied on the Federalist Papers in explicating background 
principles that framed the issue in the case.  But what the Federalist Papers said was not used to 
resolve the specific question of whether bringing guns in the schools was a matter that Congress 
could regulate under its Commerce Power. 
 
 (15)  In American Dredging Co. v. Miller,85 the Supreme Court held that federal 
admiralty law does not preempt state law forum non conveniens principles in cases filed in state 
court.  Justice Kennedy wrote a dissenting opinion in which he said:  “At the time of the framing, 
it was essential that our prospective foreign trading partners know that the United States would 
uphold its treaties, respect the general maritime law, and refrain from erecting barriers to 
commerce. The individual States needed similar assurances from each other.  See The Federalist 
No. 22, pp. 143-145 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (Hamilton). . . . . Federal admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction was the solution. See . . . The Federalist No. 80, supra, at 478 (Hamilton).”86  This 
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 The previous case was A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935), in 
which the Supreme Court struck down regulations concerning the hours and wages of persons employed 
in intrastate businesses. 
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 Id. at 576-77 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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 510 U.S. 443 (1994). 
86
 Id. at 466 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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statement serves to explicate the purposes of federal admiralty jurisdiction; Justice Kennedy did 
not cite the Federalist Papers to resolve the preemption issue before the Court. 
 
 (16) In Dennis v. Higgins,87 the Supreme Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983,88 provided a 
cause of action against state officials for violating the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.89 
Justice Kennedy wrote a dissenting opinion in which he cited the Federalist papers to establish a 
general and uncontroverted principle regarding a defect in the Articles of Confederation:  
 
The lack of a national power over commerce during the Articles of Confederation 
led to ongoing disputes among the States, and the prospect of a descent toward 
even more intense commercial animosity was one of the principal arguments in 
favor of the Constitution. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 7, pp. 62-63 (C. Rossiter 
ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton); id., No. 11, pp. 89-90 (A. Hamilton); id., No. 22, pp. 
143-145 (A. Hamilton); id., No. 42, pp. 267-269 (J. Madison); id., No. 53, p. 333 
(J. Madison).90 
 
 (17) In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,91 the Supreme Court held that a federal civil 
rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which prohibits racial discrimination in the making and 
enforcement of private contracts,92 did not address racial harassment in the course of 
employment.93  Part of the case concerned the principle of stare decisis.  On this point, writing 
for the majority, Justice Kennedy wrote:  “Although we have cautioned that ‘stare decisis is a 
principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision,’ Boys 
Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U.S. 235, 241 (1970), it is indisputable that stare decisis is a 
basic self-governing principle within the Judicial Branch, which is entrusted with the sensitive 
and difficult task of fashioning and preserving a jurisprudential system that is not based upon ‘an 
arbitrary discretion.’ The Federalist, No. 78, p. 490 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (A. Hamilton).”94  This 
reference to the Federalist Papers again concerned general principles and was not used to decide 
a particular issue in the case. 
 
 (18) In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,95 the Supreme Court upheld a state 
statute prohibiting corporations from making independent expenditures to support or oppose 
election candidates.  Justice Kennedy filed a dissenting opinion in which he said:  “It is a 
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distinctive part of the American character for individuals to join associations to enrich the public 
dialogue. . . . The theme of group identity is part of the history of American democracy. See, e.g., 
The Federalist No. 10 (J. Madison).”96  This statement provided a general background for Justice 
Kennedy’s interpretation of the First Amendment, but was not decisive in his resolution of the 
issue in the case. 
 
 (19) In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,97 the Court struck down a city plan 
requiring general contractors who were awarded city construction contracts to use “minority 
business enterprises” for 30% of their subcontracts.  The Court held that the plan violated the 
Equal Protection Clause because the city did not have a compelling justification for favoring 
minority businesses.98  In an opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Kennedy wrote:  “An 
acute awareness of the heightened danger of oppression from political factions in small, rather 
than large, political units dates to the very beginning of our national history.”99  He then quoted 
at length remarks by James Madison about parties and factions.100  As in the other nineteen cases 
described above, this statement helped to frame but was not intended to decide the issue before 
the Court. 
 
B.  Records of the Federal Constitutional Convention 
 
 The Constitution was drafted at the Federal Constitutional Convention that met in 
Philadelphia during the summer of 1787.101  An appointed secretary kept an official journal of 
the convention proceedings, and James Madison and at least eight others kept notes about what 
was said and done at the Convention.102  Madison’s notes were published in 1840.103  Half a 
century later, Professor Max Farrand gathered and chronologically organized both Madison’s 
notes and all of the other known records in his classic work, The Records of the Federal 
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 Id. at 710 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
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 See id. at 505. 
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 Id. at 523 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
100
 The quotation was:  “ ‘The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and 
interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be 
found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller 
the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plan of 
oppression. Extend the sphere and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less 
probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or 
if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength 
and to act in unison with each other.’ “ Id. (quoting The Federalist No. 10, pp. 82-84 (C. Rossiter ed. 
1961)). 
101
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Convention of 1787.104  Courts now have relied on these records in hundreds of cases.  Justice 
Kennedy has cited the records in two of his opinions.105 
 
 In one of these cases, United States v. International Business Machine Corp.,106 the 
Supreme Court held that the Export Clause, which says “No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles 
exported from any State,”107 prohibited imposing a generally applicable, non-discriminatory 
federal tax on insurance premiums for insurance policies covering exported goods.108  Justice 
Kennedy wrote a dissenting opinion in which he asserted that the Framers understood the Export 
Clause to prohibit only taxes on exports, and not taxes on insurance covering exported goods.109  
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Kennedy emphasized that “specific taxes on exported goods 
were the only taxes mentioned in the debate at the Constitutional Convention over the Export 
Clause.”110  To support this proposition, he cited numerous specific statements made at the 
Convention about the Export Clause.111  In this instance, Justice Kennedy relied directly on what 
was said at the Convention in his reasoning about the specific issue before the Court. 
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 See THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter 
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 Justice Kennedy wrote: 
For example, Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania, opposing the Clause, favored taxing 
exports as an alternative to direct taxes on individuals. 
“He considered the taxing of exports to be in many cases highly politic. 
Virginia has found her account in taxing Tobacco. All Countries having 
peculiar articles tax the exportation of them; as France her wines and 
brandies. A tax here on lumber, would fall on the W. Indies & punish 
their restrictions on our trade. The same is true of live-stock and in some 
degree of flour. In case of a dearth in the West Indies, we may extort 
what we please. Taxes on exports are a necessary source of revenue. For 
a long time the people of America will not have money to pay direct 
taxes. Seize and sell their effects and you push them into Revolts.” 2 M. 
Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 307 (rev. ed. 
1966). 
See also id., at 306 (Mr. Madison: taxes on exported goods, like tobacco, in which 
Americans were unrivalled would shift the tax burden to foreigners); id., at 360 
(Gouverneur Morris: taxes on goods are essential to embargoes, while taxes on ginseng 
and ship masts would shift the tax burden abroad, and taxes on skins, beavers, and other 
raw materials might encourage American manufactures); id., at 361 (Mr. Dickenson [sic]: 
suggesting exemption of certain articles from the Export Clause); id., at 362 (Mr. 
Fitzimmons: discussing duties imposed on wool by Great Britain). Proponents of the 
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 In the other case, Alden v. Maine,112 which is discussed above,113 Justice Kennedy 
observed that the Constitution differs from the Articles of Confederation in that it empowers the 
national government to regulate individuals.114 He wrote (as also quoted above115): “In this the 
Founders achieved a deliberate departure from the Articles of Confederation: Experience under 
the Articles had ‘exploded on all hands’ the ‘practicality of making laws, with coercive 
sanctions, for the States as political bodies.’ 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 9 
(M. Farrand ed. 1911) (J. Madison).”116  This citation resembles the citation of the Federalist 
Papers in the nineteen cases above in which Justice Kennedy uses a source of the original 
meaning of the Constitution for background and framing purposes but not to resolve the specific 
issue before the Court. 
 
C.  Records of the State Ratifying Conventions 
 
 By its terms, the Constitution could not go into effect until it was ratified by nine states in 
ratifying conventions.117  Some records of these debates were made and preserved.118  Courts 
often cite these debates as evidence of the original meaning of the Constitution.119  I could find, 
however, only one reference to these debates by Justice Kennedy. In Alden v. Maine,120 
                                                                                                                                                             
Export Clause also focused on taxes on goods. Id., at 307 (Mr. Mercer: a tax on exported 
goods encourages the raising of articles not meant for exportation); id., at 360 (Mr. 
Williamson: discussing taxation of North Carolina tobacco by Virginia); id., at 361 (Mr. 
Sherman: general prohibition on power to tax exports necessary because “[a]n 
enumeration of particular articles would be difficult invidious and improper”); id., at 363 
(Colonel Mason: discussing Virginia tax on tobacco; Mr. Clymer: discussing middle 
States’ apprehensions of taxes on products like wheat flour and provisions that, unlike 
tobacco and rice, were sold in competitive markets). Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut 
even contended that he opposed export taxes in part because “there are indeed but a few 
articles that could be taxed at all; as Tobo. rice & indigo, and a tax on these alone would 
be partial & unjust.” Id., at 360. 
Id. at 873-75. 
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discussed above,121 the Court held that state sovereign immunity prevented a government 
employee from recovering damages from the state under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act.  
In writing the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy relied heavily on statements that James 
Madison and John Marshall made at the Virginia ratifying convention to resolve the specific 
issue before the Court.122  Justice Kennedy cited Madison’s statement that “[i]t is not in the 
power of individuals to call any state into court” and Marshall’s statement that “I hope no 
gentleman will think that a state will be called at the bar of a federal court.”123 As in the three 
previous cases, Justice Kennedy is using a source of the original meaning of the Constitution to 
resolve a specific issue, rather than merely to establish background principles. 
 
D.  Acts of the First Congress 
 
 After ratification of the Constitution in the state ratifying conventions, the First Congress 
under the Constitution met from March 1789 to March 1791.124  In the First Congress, a total of 
29 persons served as senators, and 66 served as representatives.125  Many of these senators and 
representatives justifiably could consider themselves experts on the Constitution.  Ten of the 
senators and eleven of the representatives had served as delegates to the Federal Constitutional 
Convention.126  Some of them, like James Madison, Oliver Ellsworth, and Roger Sherman, had 
played especially prominent roles in the Constitution’s drafting.  Other members of the First 
Congress, like Richard Henry Lee127, had participated at state ratifying conventions even though 
they had not participated in the Federal Constitutional Convention. During its two-year term, the 
First Congress passed an astounding 96 acts.128  Courts often use these acts to make inferences 
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about the original meaning of the Constitution, assuming that the First Congress would have 
known the original meaning and would not have violated the Constitution.129 
 
 Justice Kennedy has written two opinions in which he has cited the acts of the First 
Congress.  In United States v. Locke,130 as discussed above,131 the Supreme Court held that a 
federal law regarding shipping preempted a state law attempting to regulate the safety of oil 
tankers.  After citing the Federalist Papers for the proposition that a major goal of the 
Constitution was to allow Congress regulate interstate navigation, Justice Kennedy observed that 
Congress immediately exercised this power:  “In 1789, the First Congress enacted a law by 
which vessels with a federal certificate were entitled to ‘the benefits granted by any law of the 
United States.’ Act of Sept. 1, 1789, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 55.”132  In Loving v. United States,133 as 
discussed above,134 the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to capital punishment sentencing in 
the military.  Justice Kennedy mentioned without placing much weight on the matter that the 
“Articles [of War] adopted by the First Congress placed significant restrictions on court-martial 
jurisdiction over capital offenses.”135  These citations provided background information, but 
were not aimed at resolving specific issues before the Court. 
 
E.  Dictionaries from the Founding Era 
 
 Judges and Justices sometimes consult dictionaries from the Founding period to discern 
the original meaning of the Constitution.  For example, in United States v. Lopez, Justice Thomas 
cited them to determine the meaning of “commerce” in the Commerce Clause: 
 
At the time the original Constitution was ratified, “commerce” consisted of 
selling, buying, and bartering, as well as transporting for these purposes.  See 1 S. 
Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language 361 (4th ed. 1773) (defining 
commerce as “Intercour[s]e; exchange of one thing for another; interchange of 
any thing; trade; traffick”); N. Bailey, An Universal Etymological English 
Dictionary (26th ed. 1789) (“trade or traffic”); T. Sheridan, A Complete 
Dictionary of the English Language (6th ed. 1796) (“Exchange of one thing for 
another; trade, traffick”).136 
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Justice Kennedy, however, does not appear to have relied on period dictionaries in any of his 
opinions; I could find no case in which he had cited one. 
 
IV.  Analysis of How Justice Kennedy Uses Sources of the Original Meaning 
 
 The foregoing description of how Justice Kennedy has cited sources of the original 
meaning of the Constitution leads to several observations.  First, Justice Kennedy does not cite 
sources of the original meaning of the Constitution very frequently. In his nearly 25 years on the 
bench, Justice Kennedy has cited the Federalist Papers, the records of the Constitutional 
Convention, the records from the state ratifying conventions, and the acts of the First Congress in 
only 22 cases (21 of which cited the Federalist Papers and one of which cited the records of the 
Constitutional convention but not the Federalist Papers).  This comes to an average of less than 
one citation per year. 
 
 Second, Justice Kennedy uses sources of the original meaning of the Constitution mostly 
to frame the issues before the Court, not to resolve those issues.  He followed this pattern in 18 
of the 22 cases described above. Justice Kennedy cited the sources to support general principles, 
such as the federal government is a government of limited powers, the separation of powers 
protects individual liberty, Congress has the power to regulate interstate commerce including 
navigation, the Constitution seeks to prevent states from discriminating against interstate 
commerce, and so forth. These principles were not contested in the cases, and Justice Kennedy 
did not suggest that they answered the specific questions before the Court. 
 
 Third, although Justice Kennedy does not often use sources of the original meaning to 
resolve the specific issues in constitutional cases, he is not categorically opposed to the practice. 
As indicated above, in Missouri v. Jenkins, he relied on a statement in the Federalist Papers 
indicating that courts cannot impose taxes.137 In Public Citizen, he relied on a passage in the 
Federalist Papers, which indicated that Congress could not regulate presidential nominations.138 
In International Business Machines, he relied on specific statements at the Federal Constitutional 
Convention to determine the meaning of the Export Clause.139 In Alden v. Maine, he relied on a 
statement at a state ratifying convention in determining the immunity of states from lawsuits in 
federal court.140 
 
 These observations relate directly to the three reasons identified above for why it might 
be important to know how Justice Kennedy has relied on sources of the original meaning of the 
Constitution.141  One question was whether Justice Kennedy can be properly characterized as an 
originalist.  The cases quoted above do not fully answer the question. A complete answer would 
require a survey to see whether Justice Kennedy’s conclusions match the original meaning in all 
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of his cases, regardless of the sources that he cited in reaching his conclusions.  But the citations 
do shed light on the question. Justice Kennedy clearly thinks that sources original meaning are 
important for setting the framework for constitutional issues.   At times he relies on them to 
decide the meaning of cases.   But it does not appear that he considers evidence from sources of 
the original meaning of the Constitution to be the most important grounds upon which to make 
constitutional decisions.  A judge more committed to originalist methodology presumably would 
rely on the sources original meaning of the Constitution to decide the specific issue before the 
Court in more than four cases over 25 years. 
 
 A second question concerned the sorts of arguments might be persuasive to Justice 
Kennedy.  Here we can make conclusions about which sources to cite and most the purposes for 
which sources should be cited.  The observations about how Justice Kennedy uses sources of the 
original meaning of the Constitution suggest that Justice Kennedy feels more comfortable with 
the Federalist Papers than with other sources.  Litigants therefore should consult the Federalist 
Papers for principles that might help their cases.  Justice Kennedy apparently does not see 
records from the Federal Constitutional Convention or state ratifying conventions or the Acts of 
the First Congress as pertinent nearly as often.  This may be because these other sources 
typically do not state general background principles of the kind Justice Kennedy often finds in 
the Federalist Papers.  And given that Justice Kennedy has not cited Founding-era dictionaries, 
litigants might infer that he does not find them very persuasive.  Finding evidence in such 
dictionaries therefore is probably not a priority for litigants seeking Justice Kennedy’s vote. 
 
 With regard to the use of sources of the original meaning, it appears that it would be 
helpful to cite them to establish background principles and to frame issues.  These kinds of 
citations evidently appeal to Justice Kennedy because he uses them frequently.   Justice Kennedy 
does not appear to be opposed to relying on sources of the original meaning to resolve specific 
issues.  But he apparently has not found them to be persuasive in many cases.  Litigants should 
feel free to make such arguments but should not rely exclusively on them if they want to obtain 
Justice Kennedy’s vote. 
 
 The third and final question concerns the extent to which Justice Kennedy has 
contributed to the large increase in reliance by the Supreme Court on sources of the original 
meaning of the Constitution over the past quarter-century.  Here again the answer is mixed. 
Justice Kennedy has made a contribution. He has cited these sources in his opinions in 22 cases. 
But his contribution is limited.  He refers to the sources of the original meaning the Constitution 
in less than one case per year, on average. And when he cites sources of the original meaning the 
Constitution, he generally is explicating general background principles.  The sources aid readers 
in understanding the issues before the Court, which is important, but Justice Kennedy seldom 
uses them for more than that. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
 Justice Kennedy now has served on the Supreme Court for almost 25 years, about one 
ninth of the Court’s 223 years of existence. For many of these years, he has been the swing vote 
between two groups on the Court which have differing judicial philosophies. Accordingly, 
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Justice Kennedy arguably has had more influence than any of the other justices. For these 
reasons, analyzing the work of Justice Kennedy seems highly appropriate.  It may help litigants 
before the Court in crafting their arguments, and it may help observers of the Court to understand 
the Court’s recent history. 
 
 Justice Kennedy has written 22 opinions that cite the most common sources of the 
original meaning of the Constitution. He relies on the Federalist Papers more frequently than 
other sources. He typically uses sources of the original meaning to introduce constitutional issues 
and establish basic principles, rather than to resolve specific issues before the court. These 
observations come directly from looking at the cases Justice Kennedy has decided as described 
in this essay. 
 
